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Author(s): Arlie Russell Hochschild

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Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure¹

Arlie Russell Hochschild

University of California, Berkeley

This essay proposes an emotion-management perspective as a lens through which to inspect the self, interaction, and structure. Emotion, it is argued, can be and often is subject to acts of management. The individual often works on inducing or inhibiting feelings so as to render them “appropriate” to a situation. The emotion-management perspective draws on an interactive account of emotion. It differs from the dramaturgical perspective on the one hand and the psychoanalytic perspective on the other. It allows us to inspect at closer range than either of those perspectives the relation among emotive experience, emotion management, feeling rules, and ideology. Feeling rules are seen as the side of ideology that deals with emotion and feeling. Emotion management is the type of work it takes to cope with feeling rules. Meaning-making jobs, more common in the middle class, put more premium on the individual’s capacity to do emotion work. A reexamination of class differences in child rearing suggests that middle-class families prepare their children for emotion management more and working-class families prepare them less. In this way each class prepares its children to psychologically reproduce the class structure.

Social psychology has suffered under the tacit assumption that emotion, because it seems unbidden and uncontrollable, is not governed by social rules. Social rules, for their part, are seen as applying to behavior and thought, but rarely to emotion or feeling. If we reconsider the nature of emotion² and the nature of our capacity to try shaping it, we are struck by the imperial scope of social rules. Significant links emerge among social structure, feeling rules, emotion management, and emotive experience—links I try to trace in this essay. The purpose is to suggest an area for inquiry.

¹ This paper summarizes part of the argument presented in a forthcoming book. This study has been generously supported by a Guggenheim Fellowship. Although gratitude in footnotes like this is (as this paper demonstrates) conventionalized, and although convention makes authenticity hard to decipher, I want anyway to express appreciation to Harvey Faberman, Todd Gitlin, Adam Hochschild, Robert Jackson, Jerzy Michaelowicz, Caroline Persell, Mike Rogin, Paul Russell, Thomas Scheff, Ann Swidler, Joel Telles, and the anonymous reviewers for the *AJS*.

² I define emotion as bodily cooperation with an image, a thought, a memory—a cooperation of which the individual is aware. I will use the terms “emotion” and “feeling” interchangeably, although the term “emotion” denotes a state of being overcome that “feeling” does not. The term “emotion management” is used synonymously with “emotion work” and “deep acting.”

Why is the emotive experience of normal adults in daily life as orderly as it is? Why, generally speaking, do people feel gay at parties, sad at funerals, happy at weddings? This question leads us to examine, not conventions of appearance or outward comportment, but conventions of feeling. Conventions of feeling become surprising only when we imagine, by contrast, what totally unpatterned, unpredictable emotive life might actually be like at parties, funerals, weddings, and in the family or work life of normal adults.

Erving Goffman (1961) suggests both the surprise to be explained and part of the explanation: “. . . We find that participants will hold in check certain psychological states and attitudes, for after all, the very general rule that one enter into the prevailing mood in the encounter carries the understanding that contradictory feelings will be in abeyance. . . . So generally, in fact, does one suppress unsuitable affect, that we need to look at offenses to this rule to be reminded of its usual operation” (Goffman 1961, p. 23). If we take this passage seriously, as I urge we do, we may be led back to the classic question of social order from a particular vantage point—that of emotion management. From this vantage point, rules seem to govern how people try or try not to feel in ways “appropriate to the situation.” Such a notion suggests how profoundly the individual is “social,” and “socialized” to try to pay tribute to official definitions of situations, with no less than their feelings.

Let me pause to point out that there are two possible approaches to the social ordering of emotive experience. One is to study the social factors that induce or stimulate primary (i.e., nonreflective, though by definition conscious) emotions—emotions passively undergone. The other is to study *secondary acts* performed upon the ongoing nonreflective stream of primary emotive experience. The first approach focuses on how social factors affect what people feel, the second on how social factors affect what people think and do about what they feel (i.e., acts of assessment and management). Those who take the first approach might regard those who take the second as being “overly cognitive.” But in fact the two approaches are compatible, and indeed the second, taken here, relies on some accumulation of knowledge garnered from the first.³

If we take as our object of focus what it is people think or do about feel-

³ For comprehensive, if somewhat dated, reviews of the theoretical approaches to emotion, see Hillman (1964), Carlson et al. (1959), Reymert (1950), and McDougall (1937). These reviews exclude several more recent theoretical attempts by Tomkins (1962), Arnold (1968), and Plutchik (1962). For a psychoanalytic account, see Rapaport (1953). Also see Rabkin (1968), Sprout (1952), Scheff (1973, 1977a, 1977b), Levy (1973), and Katz (1977). Various social scientists have developed their approaches via inspection of a particular emotion or feeling, as for example, jealousy (Davis 1936; Clanton and Smith 1977), envy (Foster 1972), embarrassment (Goffman 1956; Gross and Stone 1964), and love (Goode 1974; Swanson 1965). For a selective review see Hochschild (1975).

ings, several questions emerge. First, with what assumptions about emotion and situation do we begin? In other words, (a) how responsive is emotion to deliberate attempts to suppress or evoke it? (b) What sociological approach is most fruitful? Second, what are the links among social structure, ideology, feeling rules, and emotion management? To begin with, (c) are there feeling rules? (d) How do we know about them? (e) How are these rules used as baselines in social exchanges? (f) What in the nature of work and child rearing might account for different ways adults of varying classes manage their feelings? I shall sketch outlines of possible answers with the aim, in some measure, of refining the questions.

TWO ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FEELING

In order to address the first question, we might consider two basic accounts of emotion and feeling found in social psychology: the *organismic* account and the *interactive* account. The two approaches differ in what they imply about our capacity to manage emotion, and thus in what they imply about the importance of rules about managing it. I cannot do full justice here to the question of what emotion is and how it is generated, nor can I offer a full reaction to the ample literature on that question.

According to the organismic view, the paramount questions concern the relation of emotion to biologically given "instinct" or "impulse." In large part, biological factors account for the questions the organismic theorist poses. The early writings of Sigmund Freud (1911, 1915*a*, 1915*b*; see Lofgren 1968), Charles Darwin ([1872] 1955), and in some though not all respects, William James (James and Lange 1922) fit this model.⁴ The concept "emotion" refers mainly to strips of experience in which there is no conflict between one and another aspect of self; the individual "floods out," is "overcome." The image that comes to mind is that of a sudden,

⁴ W. McDougall (1948) and, to some extent, S. S. Tomkins (1962) also fit this classification. Both focus on the relation of emotion to drive or instinct (Tomkins elaborates a relation between emotion and "drive signals" whereby emotion is said to amplify drive signals). The central issues on which the two theoretical camps divide are fixity, reflexivity, and origin. (1) The organismic theorists, unlike their interactive counterparts, assume a basic fixity of emotion, based in biological givens. (2) They assume that social interaction does not basically affect emotions; the social surface remains what is implied by the term "surface." In the interactive account, this is not the case. Labeling, management, and expression of feeling (more clearly differentiated by the interactionists) are processes which can reflexively "act back" on emotion, and indeed come to constitute what we mean by the term "emotion." (3) Again, the organismic theorists are more concerned with tracing emotion back to its origins. For Freud and James the origins were energetic or somatic, and for Darwin, phylogenetic. The interactive theorists are less concerned with origin than with the interface of a situation and experience. The focus on origin leads the organismic theorists to focus on commonalities between different peoples, and between people and animals. The focus on social interface leads the interactionists to focus on differences. For recent innovations in the interactive tradition, see Kemper (1978) and Averill (1976).

automatic reflex syndrome—Darwin's instant snarl expression, Freud's tension discharge at a given breaking point of tension overload, James and Lange's notion of an instantaneous unmediated visceral reaction to a perceived stimulus, the perception of which is also unmediated by social influences.

In this first model, social factors can enter in only in regard to how emotions are stimulated and expressed (and even here Darwin took the universalist position) (see Ekman 1972, 1973). Social factors are not seen as an influence on how emotions are actively suppressed or evoked. Indeed, emotion is characterized by the fixity and universality of a knee-jerk reaction or a sneeze. In this view, one could as easily manage an emotion as one could manage a knee jerk or a sneeze. If the organismic theorist were to be presented with the concept of feeling rules, he or she would be hard put to elucidate what these rules impinge on, or what capacity of the self could be called on to try to obey a feeling rule (see Hochschild 1977). Recent attempts to link an organismic notion of emotion to social structure, such as Randall Collins's (1975) wonderfully bold attempt, suffer from the problems that were implicit in the organismic account to begin with. By Collins, as by Darwin on whom he draws, emotions are seen as capacities (or susceptibilities) within a person, to be automatically triggered, as Collins develops it, by one or another group in control of the ritual apparatus that does the "triggering" (1975, p. 59). A wholly different avenue of social control, that of feeling rules, is bypassed, because the individual's capacity to try to, or try not to feel—that to which the rule applies—is not suggested by the organismic model with which Collins begins.

In the interactive account, social influences permeate emotion more insistently, more effectively, and at more theoretically posited junctures. In large part, sociopsychological factors account for the questions the interactive theorist poses. The writings of Gerth and Mills (1964), Goffman (1956, 1959, 1961, 1967, 1974), Lazarus (1966), Lazarus and Averill (1972), Schachter and Singer (1962), Schachter (1964), Kemper (1978), Averill (1976), and aspects of late Freudian and neo-Freudian thought fit this model. To invoke the Freudian vocabulary, the image here is not that of a "runaway id," but of an ego and superego, acting upon, shaping, nagging, however ineffectively, temporarily, or consciously, the id.⁵ Emotion is sometimes posited as a psychobiological means of adaptation—an ana-

⁵ The stress on will (included in the concept of ego, but not all that "ego" refers to) is not a clean divider of the organismic from the interactive theorist. Schachter and Gerth and Mills, whom I see as members of the interactive camp, lay no particular stress on volition. Goffman stresses the phenomena that call tacitly for will. He stresses the patterned results of it, but provides no theoretical account of will itself. He posits no actor qua emotion manager who might accomplish the acts that, by inference, must get accomplished to pull off the encounters he describes so well. In my view, we must reinstitute a self capable of experiencing emotion and of working on it in socially patterned ways. (On the issue of will, see Piaget in Campbell [1976]; Solomon [1973].)

logue to other adaptive mechanisms, such as shivering when cold or perspiring when hot. But emotion differs from these other adaptive mechanisms, in that thinking, perceiving, and imagining—themselves subject to the influence of norms and situations—are intrinsically involved.

As in the first model, social factors affect how emotions are elicited and expressed. However, in addition, social factors guide the microactions of labeling (Schachter 1964; Schachter and Singer 1962; Katz 1977), interpreting (Gerth and Mills 1964), and managing emotion (Lazarus 1966). These microactions, in turn, reflect back on that which is labeled, interpreted, and managed. They are, finally, intrinsic to what we call “emotion” (see Schafer 1976). Emotion, in this second school of thought, is seen as more deeply social. Lazarus’s (1966) work in particular lends empirical weight to the interactive model. It suggests that normal adults, such as university students on whom he conducted experiments, have a considerable capacity to control emotion. It is more control than one might expect from a small child, an insane adult, or an animal, from all of which Freud in his earlier writings and Darwin drew inspiration. But since it is the emotive experience of normal adults we seek to understand, we would do well to begin with the interactive account.⁶

The Interactive Account of Emotion and Social Psychology

If emotions and feelings can to some degree be managed, how might we get a conceptual grasp of the managing act from a social perspective? The interactive account of emotion leads us into a conceptual arena “between” the Goffmanian focus on consciously designed appearances on the one hand and the Freudian focus on unconscious intrapsychic events on the other. The focus of Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969) on conscious, active, and responsive gestures might have been most fruitful had not their focus on deeds and thought almost entirely obscured the importance of feeling. (See Shott [1979] for an attempt to consider emotion from a symbolic interactionist perspective.) The self as emotion manager is an idea that borrows from both sides—Goffman and Freud—but squares completely with neither. Here I can only sketch out a few basic borrowings and departures, focusing on the departures.

Erving Goffman

Goffman guides our attention to social patterns in emotive experience. He catches an irony: moment to moment, the individual is actively negotiating

⁶ My own account of emotion draws on that proposed by Katz (1977). For Katz emotion is generated by a “schematic discrepancy,” that is, a discrepancy between the individual’s schemata and his current perception, memory, or imagining of an event or object. Also see the interesting work of Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman (1979).

a course of action, but in the long run, all the action seems like passive acquiescence to social convention. The conserving of convention is not a passive business. Goffman's approach might simply be extended and deepened by showing that people not only try to conform outwardly, but do so inwardly as well. "When they issue uniforms, they issue skins" (Goffman 1974) could be extended: "and two inches of flesh."

Yet, ironically, to study why and under what conditions "participants . . . hold in check certain psychological states . . ." (Goffman 1961, p. 23), we are forced partly out of the perspective which gave birth to the insight. I shall try to show why this is so, what the remedies might be, and how the results could be conceptually related to aspects of the psychoanalytic tradition.

First, Goffman, for reasons necessary to his purpose, maintains for the most part a studied disregard for the links between immediate social situations and macrostructure on the one hand, and individual personality on the other. If one is interested in drawing links among social structure, feeling rules, and emotion management, this studied disregard becomes a problem.

Goffman's "situationism" is a brilliant achievement, one that must be understood as a development in the intellectual history of social psychology. Earlier in the century a number of classic works linked social structure to personality, or "dominant institutions" to "typical identities," and thus also related findings in sociology and anthropology to those in psychology or psychoanalytic theory. These studies appeared in a number of fields—in anthropology, Ruth Benedict (1946); in psychoanalysis, Erich Fromm (1942), Karen Horney (1937), and Erik Erikson (1950); in sociology, David Riesman (1952, 1960), Swanson and Miller (1966), and Gerth and Mills (1964).

Possibly in response to this paradigm Goffman proposed an intermediate level of conceptual elaboration, "between" social structure and personality. His focus is on situations, episodes, encounters. The situation, the episodically emergent encounter, is not only nearly divorced from social structure and from personality; he even seems to intend his situationism as an analytic substitute for these concepts (see Goffman 1976, p. 77). Structure, he seems to say, can be not only transposed but reduced "in and down," while personality can be reduced "up and out" to the study of here-now, gone-then interactional moments.

Each interactional episode takes on the character of a minigovernment. A card game, a party, a greeting on the street exacts from us certain "taxes" in the form of appearances which we "pay" for the sake of sustaining the encounter. We are repaid in the currency of safety from disrepute. (Thanks to Harvey Farberman for discussion on this point.)

This model of the situation qua minigovernment, while useful for Goffman's purposes, leads us away from social structure and personality—two

concepts with which any study of feeling rules and emotion management would be wise to deal.⁷ To study why and under what conditions “participants . . . hold in check certain psychological states . . .” (Goffman 1961, p. 23), we are forced out of the here-now, gone-then situationism and back, in part at least, to the social structure and personality model. We are led to appreciate the importance of Goffman’s work, as it seems he does not, *as the critical set of conceptual connecting tissues by which structure and personality, real in their own right, are more precisely joined.*

Specifically, if we are to understand the origin and causes of change in “feeling rules”—this underside of ideology—we are forced back out of a study of the immediate situations in which they show up, to a study of such things as changing relations between classes or the sexes.

If we are to investigate the ways people try to manage feeling, we shall have to posit an actor capable of feeling, capable of assessing when a feeling is “inappropriate,” and capable of trying to manage feeling. The problem is that the actor Goffman proposes does not seem to feel much, is not attuned to, does not monitor closely or assess, does not actively evoke, inhibit, shape—in a word, *work on* feelings in a way an actor would have to do to accomplish what Goffman says is, in fact, accomplished in one encounter after another. We are left knowing about “suppressive work” as a final result, but knowing nothing of the process or techniques by which it is achieved. If we are to argue that social factors influence how we try to manage feelings, if we are to carry the social that far, we shall have to carry our analytic focus beyond the “black box” to which Goffman ultimately refers us.

Goffman’s actors actively manage outer impressions, but they do not actively manage inner feelings. For example, a typical Goffmanian actor, Preedy at the beach (Goffman 1959), is exquisitely attuned to outward appearance, but his glances inward at subjective feeling are fleeting and blurred. The very topic, sociology of emotion, presupposes a human capacity for, if not the actual habit of, reflecting on and shaping inner feelings, a habit itself distributed variously across time, age, class, and locale. This variation would drop from sight were we to adopt an ex-

⁷ Time: to link the momentary act of emotion work with the concept of personality, we must alter our perspective on time. An emotive episode and the attempt to shape it is, after all, a brief strip of time. Situations such as Goffman studies are also short. The focus is on the act, and the act ends, so to speak, when the theater closes and starts again when it reopens. If we extend Goffman’s analysis, by speaking now of “deep” acting, we, like him, are focusing on short episodes, on “stills” from which long movies are composed. The notion of personality implies a fairly durable, trans-situational pattern. The Casper Milquetoast personality may lead an anxiety avoidant life of 73 years. Not momentary stills, but many decades are at issue. Again, we must shift our situationist focus at the structural end when we come to speak of institutions, which live even longer than people do.

clusive focus on the actor's attentiveness to behavioral facade and assume a uniform passivity vis-à-vis feelings.

This skew in the theoretical actor is related to what from my viewpoint is another problem: Goffman's concept of acting. Goffman suggests that we spend a good deal of effort managing impressions—that is, acting. He posits only *one* sort of acting—the direct management of behavioral expression. His illustrations, though, actually point to *two* types of acting—the direct management of behavioral expression (e.g., the given-off sigh, the shoulder shrug), and the management of feeling from which expression can follow (e.g., the thought of some hopeless project). An actor playing the part of King Lear might go about his task in two ways. One actor, following the English school of acting, might focus on outward demeanor, the constellation of minute expressions that correspond to Lear's sense of fear and impotent outrage. This is the sort of acting Goffman theorizes about. Another actor, adhering to the American or Stanislavsky school of acting, might guide his memories and feelings in such a way as to elicit the corresponding expressions. The first technique we might call "surface acting," the second "deep acting." Goffman fails to distinguish the first from the second, and he obscures the importance of "deep acting." Obscuring this, we are left with the impression that social factors pervade only the "social skin," the tried-for outer appearances of the individual. We are left underestimating the power of the social.

In sum, if we are to accept the interactive account of emotion and to study the self as emotion manager, we can learn from Goffman about the link between social rule and feeling. But to elaborate this insight we might well selectively relax the theoretical strictures Goffman has stoically imposed against a focus on social structure and on personality.

Freud

The need to replace Goffman's "black-box psychology" with some theory of self, in the full sense of the term, might seem to lead to Freudian or neo-Freudian theory. Yet, here, as with Goffman, only some aspects of the Freudian model seem useful to my understanding of conscious, deliberate efforts to suppress or evoke feeling. I shall briefly discuss psychoanalytic theory to show some points of departure.

Freud, of course, dealt with emotions, but for him they were always secondary to drive. He proposed a general theory of sexual and aggressive drives. Anxiety, as a derivative of aggressive and sexual drives, was of paramount importance, while a wide range of other emotions, including joy, jealousy, depression, were given relatively little attention. He developed, and many others have since elaborated, the concept of ego defenses as generally unconscious, involuntary means of avoiding painful or un-

pleasant affect. Finally the notion of “inappropriate affect” is used to point to aspects of the individual’s ego functioning and not used to point to the social rules according to which a feeling is or is not deemed appropriate to a situation.

The emotion-management perspective is indebted to Freud for the general notion of what resources individuals of different sorts possess for accomplishing the task of emotion work (as I have defined it) and for the notion of unconscious involuntary emotion management. The emotion-management perspective differs from the Freudian model in its focus on the full range of emotions and feelings and its focus on conscious and deliberate efforts to shape feeling. From this perspective, we note too that “inappropriate emotion” has a clearly important social as well as intrapsychic side.

Let me briefly illustrate the differences between the two perspectives. In Shapiro’s well-known work on “neurotic style,” he gives an example:

An obsessive-compulsive patient—a sober, technically minded and active man—*was usually conspicuously lacking in enthusiasm or excitement in circumstances that might seem to warrant them.* On one occasion, as he talked about a certain prospect of his, namely, the good chance of an important success in his work, his sober expression was momentarily interrupted by a smile. After a few more minutes of talking, during which he maintained his soberness only with difficulty, he began quite hesitantly to speak of certain hopes that he had only alluded to earlier. Then he broke into a grin. *Almost immediately, however, he regained his usual somewhat worried expression.* As he did this, he said, “Of course, the outcome is by no means certain,” and he said this in a tone that, if anything, would suggest the outcome was almost certain to be a failure. After ticking off several of the specific possibilities for a hitch, he finally seemed to be himself again, so to speak. [Shapiro 1965, p. 192, emphasis mine]

What seems interesting about this example differs according to whether one takes the psychiatric perspective or the emotion-management perspective. First, to the psychiatrist in the case above, what circumstances warrant what degree and type of feeling seems relatively unproblematic. A doctor “knows” what inappropriate affect is; the main problem is not so much to discern misfits of feeling to situation but to explain them and to cure the patient of them. From the emotion-management perspective, on the other hand, the warranting function of circumstances is problematic. Further, the means used to assess this warranting function may well be the same for a psychiatrist as for a salesclerk or school disciplinarian. For, in a sense we all act as lay psychiatrists using unexamined means of arriving at a determination about just “what” circumstances warrant “that much” feeling of “that sort.”

What the psychiatrist, the salesclerk, and the school disciplinarian may share is a habit of comparing situation (e.g., high opportunity, associated with an accomplishment at work) with role (e.g., hopes, aspirations, ex-

pectations typical of, and expected from, those enacting the role). Social factors can enter in, to alter how we expect a role to be held, or played. If, for example, the patient were a “sober, technically minded and active” *woman* and if the observer (rightly or wrongly) assumed or expected her to value family and personal ties over worldly success, less enthusiasm at the prospect of advance might seem perfectly “appropriate.” Lack of enthusiasm would have a warrant of that social sort. Again, if the patient was an antinuclear activist and his discovery had implications for nuclear energy, that would alter the hopes and aspirations he might be expected to have at work and might warrant dismay, not enthusiasm.

We assess the “appropriateness” of a feeling by making a comparison between feeling and situation, not by examining the feeling in abstracto. This comparison lends the assessor a “normal” yardstick—a *socially* normal one—from which to factor out the personal meaning systems which may lead a worker to distort his view of “the” situation and feel inappropriately with regard to it. The psychiatrist holds constant the socially normal benchmark and focuses on what we have just factored out. The student of emotion management holds constant what is factored out and studies the socially normal benchmark, especially variations in it.

There is a second difference in what, from the two perspectives, seems interesting in the above example. From the emotion-management perspective, what is interesting is the character and direction of volition and consciousness. From the psychiatric perspective, what is of more interest is pre-will and nonconsciousness. The man above is not doing emotion work, that is, making a conscious, intended try at altering feeling. Instead he is controlling his enthusiasm by “being himself,” by holding, in Schutz’s term, a “natural attitude.” He “no longer needs to struggle not to grin; he is not in a grinning mood” (Shapiro 1965, p. 164). In order to avoid affective deviance, some individuals may face a harder task than do others, the task of consciously working on feelings in order to make up for “a natural attitude”—explainable in psychoanalytic terms—that gets them in social trouble. The hysteric working in a bureaucratic setting may face the necessity for more emotion work than the obsessive compulsive who fits in more naturally.

In sum, the emotion-management perspective fosters attention to how people try to feel, not, as for Goffman, how people try to appear to feel. It leads us to attend to how people consciously feel and not, as for Freud, how people feel unconsciously. The interactive account of emotion points to alternate theoretical junctures—between consciousness of feeling and consciousness of feeling rules, between feeling rules and emotion work, between feeling rules and social structure. In the remainder of this essay, it is these junctures we shall explore.

EMOTION WORK

By “emotion work” I refer to the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling. To “work on” an emotion or feeling is, for our purposes, the same as “to manage” an emotion or to do “deep acting.” Note that “emotion work” refers to the effort—the act of trying—and not to the outcome, which may or may not be successful. Failed acts of management still indicate what ideal formulations guide the effort, and on that account are no less interesting than emotion management that works.

The very notion of an attempt suggests an active stance vis-à-vis feeling. In my exploratory study respondents characterized their emotion work by a variety of active verb forms; “I *psyched myself up*. . . . I *squashed* my anger down. . . . I *tried hard* not to feel disappointed. . . . I *made* myself have a good time. . . . I *tried* to feel grateful. . . . I *killed* the hope I had burning.” There was also the actively passive form, as in, “I *let myself* finally feel sad.”

Emotion work differs from emotion “control” or “suppression.” The latter two terms suggest an effort merely to stifle or prevent feeling. “Emotion work” refers more broadly to the act of evoking or shaping, as well as suppressing, feeling in oneself. I avoid the term “manipulate” because it suggests a shallowness I do not mean to imply. We can speak, then, of two broad types of emotion work: *evocation*, in which the cognitive focus is on a desired feeling which is initially absent, and *suppression*, in which the cognitive focus is on an undesired feeling which is initially present. One respondent, going out with a priest 20 years her senior, exemplifies the problems of evocative emotion work: “Anyway, I started to try and make myself like him. I made myself focus on the way he talked, certain things he’d done in the past. . . . When I was with him I did like him but I would go home and write in my journal how much I couldn’t stand him. I kept changing my feeling and actually thought I really liked him while I was with him but a couple of hours after he was gone, I reverted back to different feelings. . . .”⁸ Another respondent exemplifies the work, not of working feeling up, but of working feeling down:

Last summer I was going with a guy often, and I began to feel very strongly about him. I knew though, that he had just broken up with a

⁸ The illustrations of emotion work come from a content analysis of 261 protocols given to students in two classes at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1974. Many of the illustrations come from answers to the question, “Describe as fully and concretely as possible a real situation, important to you, in which you experienced either changing a real situation to fit your feelings or changing your feelings to fit a situation. What did it mean to you?” Three coders coded the protocols. The findings will be reported in a later study. I will only mention here that 13% of the men but 32% of the women were coded as “changing feeling” instead of changing situation, and of those who changed feelings, far more women reported doing so agentially rather than passively.

girl a year ago because she had gotten too serious about him, so I was afraid to show any emotion. I also was afraid of being hurt, so I attempted to change my feelings. *I talked myself into not caring about Mike . . .* but I must admit it didn't work for long. *To sustain this feeling I had to almost invent bad things about him and concentrate on them or continue to tell myself he didn't care. It was a hardening of emotions*, I'd say. It took a lot of work and was unpleasant, because I had to concentrate on anything I could find that was irritating about him.

Often emotion work is aided by setting up an emotion-work system, for example, telling friends of all the worst faults of the person one wanted to fall out of love with, and then going to those friends for reinforcement of this view of the ex-beloved. This suggests another point: emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself.

In each case the individual is conscious of a moment of "pinch," or discrepancy, between what one does feel and what one wants to feel (which is, in turn, affected by what one thinks one ought to feel in such a situation). In response, the individual may try to eliminate the pinch by working on feeling. Both the sense of discrepancy and the response to it can vary in time. The managing act, for example, can be a five-minute stopgap measure, or it can be a more long-range gradual effort suggested by the term "working through."

There are various techniques of emotion work. One is *cognitive*: the attempt to change images, ideas, or thoughts in the service of changing the feelings associated with them.⁹ A second is *bodily*: the attempt to change somatic or other physical symptoms of emotion (e.g., trying to breathe slower, trying not to shake). Third, there is *expressive* emotion work: trying to change expressive gestures in the service of changing inner feeling (e.g., trying to smile, or to cry). This differs from simple display in that it is directed toward change in feeling. It differs from bodily emotion work in that the individual tries to alter or shape one or another of the classic public channels for the expression of feeling.

These three techniques are distinct theoretically, but they often, of course, go together in practice. For example:

⁹ There may be various types of cognitive emotion work. All can be described as attempts to recodify a situation. By recodification I mean reclassification of a situation into what are previously established mental categories of situations. As in an initial, more automatic codification of a situation, deliberate recodification means asking oneself (a) What category in my classification schema of situations fits this new situation? (the schema may include blame-in situations, blame-out situations, credit-in situations, credit-out situations, etc.), and (b) What category in my classification schema of emotions fits the emotion I'm feeling right now? (i.e., is it anger, general anxiety, disappointment?). In deliberate recodifications, one tries to change the classification of outward and inward reality. (To translate this idea into Lazarus's framework, we might speak of the individual trying consciously to alter his or her appraisal of a situation so as to change the coping process [Lazarus 1966].)

I was a star halfback in high school. Before games I didn't feel the upsurge of adrenalin—in a word I wasn't "psyched up." (This was due to emotional difficulties I was experiencing and still experience—I was also an A student whose grades were dropping.) Having been in the past a fanatical, emotional, intense player, a "hitter" recognized by coaches as a very hard worker and a player with "desire," this was very upsetting. *I did everything I could to get myself "up." I would try to be outwardly "rah rah" or get myself scared of my opponents—anything to get the adrenalin flowing.* I tried to look nervous and intense before games, so at least the coaches wouldn't catch on. . . . When actually I was mostly bored, or in any event, not "up." I recall before one game wishing I was in the stands watching my cousin play for his school, rather than "out here."

Emotion work becomes an object of awareness most often, perhaps, when the individual's feelings do not fit the situation, that is, when the latter does not account for or legitimate feelings in the situation. A situation (such as a funeral) often carries with it a proper definition of itself ("this is a time of facing loss"). This official frame carries with it a sense of what it is fitting to feel (sadness). It is when this tripartite consistency among situation, conventional frame, and feeling is somehow ruptured, as when the bereaved feels an irrepressible desire to laugh delightedly at the thought of an inheritance, that rule and management come into focus. It is then that the more normal flow of deep convention—the more normal fusion of situation, frame, and feeling—seems like an accomplishment.

The smoothly warm airline hostess, the ever-cheerful secretary, the un-irritated complaint clerk, the undisgusted proctologist, the teacher who likes every student equally, and Goffman's unflappable poker player may all have to engage in deep acting, an acting that goes well beyond the mere ordering of display. Work to make feeling and frame consistent with situation is work in which individuals continually and privately engage. But they do so in obeisance to rules not completely of their own making.

FEELING RULES

We feel. We try to feel. We want to try to feel. The social guidelines that direct how we want to try to feel may be describable as a set of socially shared, albeit often latent (not thought about unless probed at), rules. In what way, we may ask, are these rules themselves known and how are they developed?¹⁰

¹⁰ That we can single out such a thing as "feeling rules" is itself a commentary on the ironic posture of the self legitimated in modern culture. Modern urban cultures foster much more distance (the stance of the observing ego) from feeling than do traditional cultures. Jerzy Michaelowicz, a graduate student at the University of California, San Diego, observed that traditional and tight-knit subcultures put people directly inside the framework of feeling rules and remove ironic distance or sense of choice about them. He reported on some research in which one Hassidic rabbi was asked, "Did you feel happy at the Passover ceremony?" "Of course!" came the incredulous reply.

To begin with, let us consider several common forms of evidence for feeling rules. In common parlance, we often talk about our feelings or those of others as if rights and duties applied directly to them. For example, we often speak of “having the right” to feel angry at someone. Or we say we “should feel more grateful” to a benefactor. We chide ourselves that a friend’s misfortune, a relative’s death, “should have hit us harder,” or that another’s good luck, or our own, should have inspired more joy. We know feeling rules, too, from how others react to what they infer from our emotive display. Another may say to us, “You *shouldn’t feel* so guilty; it wasn’t your fault,” or “You *don’t have a right* to feel jealous, given our agreement.” Another may simply declare an opinion as to the fit of feeling to situation, or may cast a claim upon our managerial stance, presupposing this opinion. Others may question or call for an account of a particular feeling in a situation, whereas they do not ask for an accounting of some other situated feeling (Lyman and Scott 1970). Claims and callings for an account can be seen as *rule reminders*. At other times, a person may, in addition, chide, tease, cajole, scold, shun—in a word, sanction us for “mis-feeling.” Such sanctions are a clue to the rules they are meant to enforce.

Rights and duties set out the proprieties as to the *extent* (one can feel “too” angry or “not angry enough”), the *direction* (one can feel sad when one should feel happy), and the *duration* of a feeling, given the situation against which it is set. These rights and duties of feeling are a clue to the depth of social convention, to one final reach of social control.

There is a distinction, in theory at least, between a feeling rule as it is known by our sense of what we can *expect* to feel in a given situation, and a rule as it is known by our sense of what we *should* feel in that situation. For example, one may realistically expect (knowing oneself and one’s neighbor’s parties) to feel bored at a large New Year’s Eve party and at the same time acknowledge that it would be more fitting to feel exuberant. However, “expect to feel” and “should ideally feel” often coincide, as below:

Marriage, chaos, unreal, completely different in many ways than I imagined. Unfortunately we rehearsed the morning of our wedding at eight o’clock. The wedding was to be at eleven o’clock. It wasn’t like I thought (everyone would know what to do). They didn’t. That made me nervous. My sister didn’t help me get dressed or flatter me (nor did anyone in the dressing room until I asked them). I was depressed. I wanted to be so happy on our wedding day. I never dreamed how anyone would cry at their wedding. A wedding is “the happy day” of one’s life. I couldn’t believe that some of my best friends couldn’t make it to my wedding and that added to a lot of little things. So I started out to the church and all these things that I always thought would not happen at my wedding went through my mind. I broke down—I cried going down. “Be happy” I told myself. Think of the friends, and relatives that are present. (But I finally said to myself, “Hey people aren’t getting married, you are. It’s for Rich [my husband] and you.”) From down the pretty long aisle we looked at each

other's eyes. His love for me changed my whole being. From that point on we joined arms. I was relieved and the tension was gone. In one sense it meant misery—but in the true sense of two people in love and wanting to share life—it meant the world to me. It was beautiful. It was indescribable.

In any given situation, we often invest what we expect to feel with idealization. To a remarkable extent these idealizations vary socially. If the “old-fashioned bride” above anticipates a “right” to feel jealous at any possible future infidelity, the young “flower child” below rejects just this right.

. . . when I was living down south, I was involved with a group of people, friends. We used to spend most evenings after work or school together. We used to do a lot of drugs, acid, coke or just smoke dope and we had this philosophy that we were very communal and did our best to share everything—clothes, money, food, and so on. I was involved with this one man—and thought I was “in love” with him. He in turn had told me that I was very important to him. Anyway, this one woman who was a very good friend of mine at one time and this man started having a sexual relationship, supposedly without my knowledge. I knew though and had a lot of mixed feelings about it. I thought, intellectually, that I had no claim to the man, and believed in fact that no one should ever try to *own* another person. I believed also that it was none of my business and I had no reason to worry about their relationship together, for it had nothing really to do with my friendship with either of them. I also believed in sharing. But I was horribly hurt, alone and lonely, depressed and I couldn't shake the depression and on top of those feelings I felt guilty for having those possessively jealous feelings. And so I would continue going out with these people every night, and try to suppress my feelings. My ego was shattered. I got to the point where I couldn't even laugh around them. So finally I confronted my friends and left for the summer and traveled with a new friend. I realized later what a heavy situation it was, and it took me a long time to get myself together and feel whole again.

Whether the convention calls for trying joyfully to possess, or trying casually not to, the individual compares and measures experience against an expectation often idealized. It is left for motivation (“what I want to feel”) to mediate between feeling rule (“what I should feel”) and emotion work (“what I try to feel”). Some of the time many of us can live with a certain dissonance between “ought” and “want,” or between “want” and “try to.” But the attempts to reduce emotive dissonance are our periodic clues to rules of feeling.

A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules, such as rules of etiquette, rules of bodily comportment, and those of social interaction in general (Goffman 1961). A feeling rule is like these other kinds of rules in the following ways: It delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling. Such zoning ordinances describe a metaphoric floor and ceil-

ing, there being room for motion and play between the two. Like other rules, feeling rules can be obeyed halfheartedly or boldly broken, the latter at varying costs. A feeling rule can be in varying proportions external or internal. Feeling rules differ curiously from other types of rules in that they do not apply to action but to what is often taken as a precursor to action. Therefore they tend to be latent and resistant to formal codification.

Feeling rules reflect patterns of social membership. Some rules may be nearly universal, such as the rule that one should not enjoy killing or witnessing the killing of a human being, including oneself.¹¹ Other rules are unique to particular social groups and can be used to distinguish among them as alternate governments or colonizers of individual internal events.

FRAMING RULES AND FEELING RULES: ISSUES IN IDEOLOGY

Rules for managing feeling are implicit in any ideological stance; they are the “bottom side” of ideology. Ideology has often been construed as a flatly cognitive framework, lacking systematic implications for how we manage feelings, or, indeed, for how we feel. Yet, drawing on Durkheim (1961),¹² Geertz (1964), and in part on Goffman (1974), we can think of ideology as an interpretive framework that can be described in terms of framing rules and feeling rules. By “framing rules” I refer to the rules according to which we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations. For example, an individual can define the situation of getting fired as yet another instance of capitalists’ abuse of workers or as yet another result of personal failure. In each case, the frame may reflect a more general rule about assigning blame. By “feeling rules” I refer to guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation. For example, according to one feeling rule, one can be legitimately angry at the boss or company; according to another, one cannot. Framing and feeling rules are back to back and mutually imply each other.

¹¹ But this, too, seems to be culturally variable. Erving Goffman points out that hangings in the 16th century were a social event that the participant was “supposed to enjoy,” a rule that has since disappeared in civilian society.

¹² Durkheim, in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, conveys just this understanding of the relation of world view to feeling rules: “When the Christian, during the ceremonies commemorating the Passion, and the Jew, on the anniversary of the fall of Jerusalem, fast and mortify themselves, it is not in giving way to a sadness which they feel spontaneously. Under these circumstances, the internal state of the believer is out of all proportion to the severe abstinences to which they submit themselves. If he is sad, it is primarily because *he consents to being sad. And he consents to it in order to affirm his faith*” (Durkheim 1961, p. 224). Again, “An individual . . . if he is strongly attached to the society of which he is a member, *feels that he is morally held to participating in its sorrows and joys*; not to be interested in them would be equivalent to breaking the bonds uniting him to the group; it would be renouncing all desire for it and contradicting himself” (1961, p. 446, emphases mine).

It follows that when an individual changes an ideological stance, he or she drops old rules and assumes new ones for reacting to situations, cognitively and emotively. A sense of rights and duties applied to feelings in situations is also changed. One uses emotion sanctions differently and accepts different sanctioning from others. For example, feeling rules in American society have differed for men and women because of the assumption that their natures differ basically. The feminist movement brings with it a new set of rules for framing the work and family life of men and women: the same balance of priorities in work and family now ideally applies to men as to women. This carries with it implications for feeling. A woman can now as legitimately (as a man) become angry (rather than simply upset or disappointed) over abuses at work, since her heart is supposed to be in that work and she has the right to hope, as much as a man would, for advancement. Or, a man has the right to feel angry at the loss of custody if he has shown himself the fitter parent. "Old-fashioned" feelings are now as subject to new chidings and cajolings as are "old-fashioned" perspectives on the same array of situations.

One can defy an ideological stance not simply by maintaining an alternative frame on a situation but by maintaining an alternative set of feeling rights and obligations. One can defy an ideological stance by inappropriate affect and by refusing to perform the emotion management necessary to feel what, according to the official frame, it would seem fitting to feel. Deep acting or emotion work, then, can be a form of obeisance to a given ideological stance, lax emotion management a clue to an ideology lapsed or rejected.

As some ideologies gain acceptance and others dwindle, contending sets of feeling rules rise and fall.¹³ Sets of feeling rules contend for a place in people's minds as a governing standard with which to compare the actual lived experience of, say, the senior prom, the abortion, the wedding, the birth, the first job, the first layoff, the divorce. What we call "the changing climate of opinion" partly involves a changed framing of the "same" sorts of events. For example, each of two mothers may feel guilty about leaving her small child at day care while working all day. One mother, a feminist, may feel that she should not feel as guilty as she does. The second, a traditionalist, may feel that she should feel more guilty than, in fact, she does feel.

Part of what we refer to as the psychological effects of "rapid social change," or "unrest," is a change in the relation of feeling rule to feeling and a lack of clarity about what the rule actually is, owing to conflicts and

¹³ Collins suggests that ideology functions as a weapon in the conflict between contending elites. Groups contend not only for access to the means of economic production or the means of violence but also for access to the means of "emotion production" (1975, p. 59). Rituals are seen as useful tools for forging emotional solidarity (that can be used against others) and for setting up status hierarchies (that can dominate those who find that the new ideals have denigrating effects on themselves).

contradictions between contending sets of rules. Feelings and frames are deconventionalized, but not yet reconventionalized. We may, like the marginal man, say, "I don't know how I should feel."

It remains to note that ideologies can function, as Randall Collins rightly notes (1975), as weapons in the conflict between contending elites and social strata. Collins suggests that elites try to gain access to the emotive life of adherents by gaining legitimate access to ritual, which for him is a form of emotive technology. Developing his view, we can add that elites, and indeed social groups in general, struggle to assert the legitimacy of their framing rules and their feeling rules. Not simply the evocation of emotion but laws governing it can become, in varying degrees, the arena of political struggle.

FEELING RULES AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE

The seemingly static links among ideology, feeling rules, and emotion management come alive in the process of social exchange. Students of social interaction have meant two things by the term "social exchange." Some have referred to the exchange of goods and services between people (Blau 1964; Simpson 1972; Singelmann 1972). Others (G. H. Mead) have referred to an exchange of gestures, without the cost-benefit accounting referred to in the first usage. Yet acts of display, too, may be considered "exchanged" in the limited sense that the individual very often feels that a gesture is owed to oneself or another. I refer, then, to exchange of acts of display based on a prior, shared understanding of patterned entitlement. Any gesture—a cool greeting, an appreciative laugh, the apology for an outburst—is measured against a prior sense of what is reasonably owed another, given the sort of bond involved. Against this background measure, some gestures will seem more than ample, others less.

The exchange of gestures has, in turn, two aspects; it is an exchange of display acts (Goffman 1969, 1967)—that is, of surface acting—and also an exchange of emotion work—that is, of deep acting. In either case, rules (display rules or feeling rules), once agreed upon, establish the worth of a gesture and are thus *used* in social exchange as a medium of exchange. Feeling rules establish the basis of worth to be ascribed to a range of gestures, including emotion work. Emotion work is a gesture in a social exchange; it has a function there and is not to be understood merely as a facet of personality.

There seem to be two ways in which feeling rules come into play in social exchange. In the first, the individual takes the "owed" feeling to heart, takes it seriously. For example, a young woman on the eve of her college graduation felt anxious and depressed but thought that she "ought to feel happy," and that she "owed this happiness" to her parents for making

her graduation possible. The parents felt entitled to a series of gestures indicating her pleasure. The young graduate could “pay” her parents in emotive display, a surface acting dissociated from her “real” definition of the situation. Going one step further, she could pay them with a gesture of deep acting—of trying to feel. The most generous gesture of all is the act of successful self-persuasion, of genuine feeling and frame change, a deep acting that jells, that works, that in the end is not phony (since it is what the emotion *is*) though it is none the less not a “natural” gift.

The second way feeling rules come into play in exchange is shown when the individual does not take the affective convention seriously; he or she plays with it. For example, an airport observation: There are two airline ticket agents, one experienced, one new on the job. The new agent is faced with the task of rewriting a complex ticket (involving change of date, lower fare, and credit of the difference between the previous and present fare to be made toward an air travel card, etc.). The new ticket agent looks for the “old hand,” who is gone, while the customers in line shift postures and stare intently at the new agent. The “old hand” finally reappears after 10 minutes, and the following conversation takes place: “I was looking for you. You’re supposed to be my instructor.” Old hand: “Gee,” with an ironic smile, “I am *really* sorry. I feel *so* bad I wasn’t here to help out” (they both laugh). The inappropriate feeling (lack of guilt, or sympathy) can be played upon in a way that says, “Don’t take my nonpayment in emotion work, or display work personally. I don’t want to work here. You can understand that.” The laughter at an ironic distance from the affective convention suggests also an intimacy; we do not need these conventions to hold us together. What we share is the defiance of them.

COMMODITIZATION OF FEELING

In the beginning we asked how feeling rules might vary in salience across social classes. One possible approach to this question is via the connections among social exchange, commoditization of feeling, and the premium, in many middle-class jobs, on the capacity to manage meanings.

Conventionalized feeling may come to assume the properties of a commodity. When deep gestures of exchange enter the market sector and are bought and sold as an aspect of labor power, feelings are commoditized. When the manager gives the company his enthusiastic faith, when the airline stewardess gives her passengers her psyched-up but quasi-genuine reassuring warmth, what is sold as an aspect of labor power is deep acting.

But commoditization of feeling may not have equal salience for all social classes. It may have more salience for the middle class than for the working class. The way each class socializes its children may, furthermore, prepare them for future demands for the skill of emotion management.

When I speak of social class, it is not strictly speaking to income, education, or occupational status that I refer, but to something roughly correlated to these—the on-the-job task of creating and sustaining appropriate meanings. The bank manager, the IBM executive, for example, may be required, in part, to sustain a definition of self, office, and organization as “up and coming,” or “on the go,” “caring,” or “reliable,” meanings most effectively sustained through acts upon feeling. Feeling rules are of utmost salience in jobs such as these; rule reminders and sanctions are more in play. It is not, as Erich Fromm suggests, that the modern middle-class man “sells his personality,” but that, more precisely, many jobs call for an appreciation of display rules, feeling rules, and a capacity for deep acting.

Working-class jobs more often call for the individual’s external behavior and the products of it—a car part assembled, a truck delivered 500 miles away, a road repaired. The creation and sustaining of meanings goes on, but it is not such an important aspect of work. Physical labor is more commoditized, meaning-making and feeling, less. Surely, too, there are working- or lower-class jobs that do require the capacity to sustain meanings and to do so, when necessary, by emotion work; the jobs of prostitute (Elmer Pascua, work in progress) and personal servant require feeling management. But to the extent that meaning-making work tends to be middle-class work, feeling rules are more salient in the middle class.

There are jobs, like that of secretary or airline stewardess, with relatively low financial rewards and little authority, which nonetheless require a high degree of emotion and display management. Such jobs are often filled by women, many of whom come from the middle class. Such workers are especially important as a source of insight about emotion management. Being less rewarded for their work than their superiors, they are more likely to feel detached from, and be perceptive about, the rules governing deep acting. Deep acting is less likely to be experienced as part of the self and more likely to be experienced as part of the job. Just as we can learn more about “appropriate situation-feeling fits” by studying misfits, so too we can probably understand commoditized feeling better from those for whom it is a salient form of alienation (see Kanter’s [1977] excellent chapters on secretaries).

CLASS, CHILD REARING, AND EMOTION WORK

Middle- and working-class parents tend to control their children in different ways (Kohn 1963, 1969; Bernstein 1971). Given the general pattern of class inheritance, each class tends to prepare its children with the skills necessary to “its” type of work environment and to pass on class-appropriate ways.

Middle-class parents tend to control via appeals to feeling, and the con-

trol is more *of* feeling.¹⁴ The working-class parent, by contrast, tends to control via appeals to behavior, and the control is more *of* behavior and its consequences (Kohn 1963; Bernstein 1971). That is, the middle-class child is more likely to be punished for “feeling the wrong way, or seeing things in the wrong light,” or having the “wrong intention,” whereas the working-class child is more likely to be punished for wrong behavior and its consequences. The class difference in socialization amounts to different degrees of training for the commoditization of feeling. This is yet another way the class structure reproduces itself. (Thanks to Caroline Persell for this point.)

It may well be that, especially among the middle class, a corresponding value is now placed on “authenticity,” on things as they “truly are” or “once were.” Authenticity, which Lionel Trilling has described as the “new moral virtue,” when it refers to unworked-over feeling, may be rendered scarce for those in the meaning-making sector. For this sector, the pattern may be that of conventionalizing feeling, putting it on the market, and looking for “authenticity” (see Trilling 1972).¹⁵

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Why, we asked at the beginning, do we feel in ways appropriate to the situation as much of the time as we do? One suggested answer is: because we actively try to manage what we feel in accordance with latent rules. In order to elaborate this suggestion we considered first the responsiveness of emotion to acts of management as it is treated in the organismic and interactive account of emotion. According to the interactive account, we are not

¹⁴ As Kohn comments, “. . . middle class mothers are far more likely to punish their son physically for what they call loss of temper than for behavior defined as wild play. They appear to find the child's loss of temper, but not his wild play, particularly intolerable” (1963, p. 308). Again, “. . . The interview reports indicate that the distinction between wild play and loss of temper was most often made in terms of the child's presumed intent, as judged by his preceding actions . . . if his actions seemed to stem from the frustration of not having his own way, they were judged to indicate loss of temper” (Kohn 1963).

¹⁵ According to Trilling, the place of “sincerity,” as a moral virtue, has been taken (Trilling's verb is “usurped”) by “authenticity.” Sincerity refers to the relation between inner feeling and outward display. Trilling offers many definitions of authenticity, but one seems to refer to the relation between the self as emotion manager and the inner feelings so managed. He cites Wordsworth's poem “Michael” about a very old shepherd: “When Michael, after having lost his son Luke to the corruption of the city, continues to build the sheepfold which he and the boy had ceremonially begun together, his neighbors report of him that sometimes he sat the whole day, ‘and never lifted up a single stone’” (1972, p. 93). There is no act of self upon feeling; he is not psyching himself “up” or “down,” he is not “letting himself” feel grief, or deliberately “getting into” his grief. It is on this account called “authentic,” and deemed nowadays valuable. What now ironically undermines authenticity, as a virtue, is the cultural belief in the mutability of inner feeling and the individual's capacity, with therapeutic guidance or otherwise, via “emotion work” or otherwise, to change fundamentally what is not implacably ascribed after all.

always passive vis-à-vis an uncontrollable flood of feeling, and those occasional efforts to actively shape our feeling can sometimes be effective. Taking this account I began to articulate the emotion-management perspective first by distinguishing it from the dramaturgical perspective on the one hand and the psychoanalytic perspective on the other. I then suggested some links among emotive experience, deep acting, and feeling rules. In turn, feeling rules were seen as the bottom side of ideology and therefore subject to the same pressures for change as are ideologies.

Conventions of feeling (i.e., what one is supposed to feel) are used in social exchange between individuals. Individuals operate their exchanges according to a prior sense of what is owed and owing. Individuals see themselves as being owed and as owing gestures of emotion work, and they exchange such gestures. People bond, in the emotive sense, either by fulfilling the emotive requirements situations call forth (e.g., the graduate trying to feel happy) or by holding just these requirements to one side (the ironic ticket agent acknowledging the sincere feeling “due” the other even while playing with that notion of debt).

Just as gestures of emotion work can be exchanged in private, so they can be exchanged in the marketplace, as an aspect of what is sold and bought as labor power. In such a case we can speak of the “commoditization” of emotion work. This prevails more for workers whose job it is to make and sustain meanings (e.g., “this is an up-and-coming company”; “this is a pleasant, safe airplane”)—jobs found more in the middle class. Commoditization is less salient for those in physical labor or nonsocial mental labor, more common in the working class. A reexamination of class differences in child rearing suggests that middle-class families prepare their children for emotion management more, working-class families less. Each, in this way, prepares its children to psychologically reproduce the class structure.

The emotion-management perspective can be applied to any number of areas. We know little about how feeling rules vary in content from one occupation to another. The funeral parlor director, the doctor, the complaints clerk, the day-care worker all apply a sense of “should” to the situated feelings that emerge in the course of a week. How do these “shoulds” differ? Crosscutting occupational and class differences, they are likely to exhibit cultural differences associated with gender and ethnicity. Indeed, a good place to study change in feeling rules would be the strata of persons for whom the *right* of men to cry, or feel fearful, is extended over a greater range of situations, and for whom the *right* of women to open anger is extended over a larger, sanction-free, zone. How has this set of feeling rules, as the underside of feminist ideology, altered the understanding between men and women as to what feelings are latently “owed” and “owing”? We need to ask how different sexes, classes, and ethnic and

religious groups differ in the sense of what one “ought to” or “has the right to” feel in a situation. How different is the burden of hidden work trying to obey latent laws? Finally, in whose interest are these feeling rules? Some managing of feeling promotes the social good. Some does not. Surely the flight attendant’s sense that she “should feel cheery” does more to promote profit for United than to enhance her own inner well-being.

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